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Abstract
We investigate the effect of remittances from migrated family members on informal inter-
household transfers - an issue that has received limited attention in the literature. Using rich
panel data from urban Ethiopia, we show that receiving international remittances significantly
increases the value of private domestic inter-household transfers, whereas receiving domestic
remittances does not have any effect. We also show that the transfers sent respond to shocks
to a great extent. Our results provide new evidence on the trickle-down effects of interna-
tional remittances, effects important to consider when analyzing the impact of international
remittances on household outcomes in recipient countries.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we use rich panel data spanning 15 years to investigate whether international remit-
tances stimulate inter-household transfers in urban Ethiopia. Households in developing countries
are vulnerable to risk and shocks and generally lack access to formal financial markets to insure
themselves accordingly. Instead, households engage in a variety of informal strategies to mitigate
risk and cope with shocks. For example, they may adjust their production choices and asset
portfolios and engage in precautionary savings, gift-giving, and informal transfers (Paxson, 1992;
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1995; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997). International remittances are
a type of informal transfer that has attracted increasing attention in the literature on transfers in
developing countries in recent years. According to World Bank (2011), the value of international
remittances to the developing world reached US$350 billion in 2011, which is 50 percent more than
the total official development assistance that these countries received from the developed world
in the same year. The rapid increase in international remittances has sparked a large number
of studies attempting to measure their impact on various household outcomes, including poverty,
education, health, labor supply, and investment in recipient countries.1
Several previous studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2008 in Ghana; Lokshin et al., 2010 in Nepal;
Taylor et. al, 2005 in Mexico; Yang & Martinez, 2006 in the Philippines; and Alem, 2015 in
Ethiopia) have documented that remittances improve consumption by recipient households and
hence reduce poverty. Remittances have also been shown to help households reduce consumption
volatility (Combes & Ebeke, 2010), loosen liquidity constraints, and finance long-term human
and physical capital investment (Taylor, 1999). A related strand of literature has also studied
private inter-household transfer flows within countries (see, e.g., Cox, 1987; Cox, et al. 1998b,
2004). Studies from various developing countries indicate that a large share of the households are
involved in private financial transfers and gift-giving with other households (e.g., Kazianga, 2006)
and that households use these transfers as risk-sharing mechanisms (Fafchamps & Lund, 2003;
Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001).
Although the impact of remittances on household outcomes and private transfer flows has been
investigated separately in numerous previous studies, much less is known about the inter-linkages
between receiving remittances and the sending of private inter-household transfers. Receiving re-
mittances might enable a household to share more of its resources with other households, which
could lead to trickle-down effects on non-migrant households that do not directly receive remit-
tances. Investigating this issue is relevant because if households increase their transfers when
they receive international remittances, then the effect of international remittances on welfare in
recipient countries extends beyond the direct recipient households. This paper uses five rounds of
rich panel data spanning 15 years from urban Ethiopia to investigate whether international and
domestic remittances stimulate private inter-household transfers.
Urban Ethiopia is a valuable setting for studying the role of international remittances in stim-
ulating inter-household transfers. The value of international remittances received by the country
1See Adams (2011) for an extensive survey of the recent literature on the household-level impact of international
remittances in developing countries. Three earlier literature reviews have been undertaken by Lopez et al. (2005),
Ruizz and Vargas-Silva (2009), and the Social Science Research Council (2009).
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has increased rapidly in the last decade, and it has been shown that they play an important role
in reducing households’ poverty (Alem, 2015) and in improving subjective well-being among both
urban and rural households (Alem & Ko¨hlin, 2013; Andersson, 2012). In recent years, Ethiopia
has also experienced rapid economic growth and double-digit inflation. The high inflation has
affected the welfare of the urban population negatively, and informal transfers have become an
important coping mechanism (Alem & So¨derbom, 2012). In this context, analysis of the potential
links between remittances and private transfers using robust panel data models on relatively long
panel data provides an important opportunity to explore the additional channels through which
remittances can affect household outcomes in migrant source countries.
We provide regression-based evidence that international remittances stimulate private inter-
household transfers, while domestic remittances do not. We estimate alternative panel data models
controlling for household fixed effects (time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity) to disentangle
the effect of remittances on households’ transfer behavior. Our results show that a one percent
increase in the value of remittances received from abroad results in a 0.07 percent increase in
transfers to other households. This finding provides some evidence on the trickle-down welfare
effects of international remittances on households in recipient countries. However, we do not find
a statistically significant impact of domestic remittances on inter-household transfers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and presents
the Ethiopian context. Section 3 describes the panel data, and Section 4 outlines the empirical
models used in the analysis. Section 5 presents the main empirical results from alternative linear
panel data models, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Private Inter-household Transfers
Private inter-household transfers are likely to be the main source of loans and transfers in de-
veloping countries, where there are limited public welfare programs and imperfect formal finan-
cial markets. Households form economic ties with each other and engage in income transfers,
gift exchange, and other transactions to smooth consumption. In a seminal paper, Townsend
(1994) shows how households in a village create informal arrangements to mitigate risk. Empirical
evidence shows that inter-household transfers, remittances, and gifts are used for consumption-
smoothing purposes in rural areas (Lucas & Stark, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1988). Similarly, Fafchamps
and Lund (2003) show that households in rural Philippines rely on gift-giving and zero-interest
informal credits as risk-sharing mechanisms within networks of friends and relatives. Although
most studies on private inter-household transfers have focused on rural households, there is some
evidence that such transfers also play an important role in risk sharing in urban areas of developing
countries (e.g., Cox & Jimenez, 1998a; Kanzianga, 2006; Alvi & Dendir, 2009).
Apart from acting as important risk-sharing mechanisms, private inter-household transfers can
potentially affect household welfare by redistributing the income gains from remittances sent from
abroad. Most studies investigating the impact of remittances on households assume that the
benefits are limited to the recipient households. The two exceptions to this observation are Yang
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and Martinez (2006) and Beyene (2012). Yang and Martinez (2006) provide empirical evidence
from the Philippines that remittances also affect non-recipient households. Their results show that
an increase in remittances due to an exchange rate shock led to a decrease in poverty not only for
migrant households but also for non-migrant households. They also show that an increase in the
amount of remittances received from abroad increased the gift receipts by non-migrant households,
suggesting that transfers between migrant and non-migrant households could at least partly explain
the poverty reductions among non-migrant households in the Philippines. Beyene (2012) used a
simple insurance model and the 2004 wave of the panel data we use in the present paper and
documented, controlling for total household income and other covariates, that remittances have a
positive impact on the amount of transfers sent to other households in urban Ethiopia.
How the sending of inter-household transfers responds to remittances received ultimately de-
pends on the motives for sending transfers. Although determining the underlying transfer motives
goes beyond the scope of this paper, theories of why households send transfers can give some guid-
ance on how the receiving of remittances affects the sending of inter-household transfers. Three
main models explaining the sending of private inter-household transfers are discussed and tested
in the literature: the altruistic model, where the donor is driven by a concern about the well-being
of the recipient and transfers depend on the financial situation of the donor and the recipient
(Becker, 1974); the exchange motive model, where transfers are driven by reciprocity (Cox, 1987;
Foster & Rosenzweig, 2001); and finally the mutual insurance model, where the donor enters into
mutual agreements and uses transfers to smooth consumption (Townsend, 1994).2
Previous empirical studies on the motives driving inter-household transfers have typically been
carried out by exploring how these transfers vary with the income of the recipient.3 The studies are
often motivated by crowding out concerns, i.e., if public transfers are followed by compensatory
reductions in private transfers, the effect of the public transfer programs might ultimately be
neutralized. Controlling for all other relevant household variables, the present study will take the
income (or more precisely the remittance income) of the donor into account to shed light on how
different motives could imply different predictions regarding the relationship between remittances
and inter-household transfers. If altruism is the dominant motive, and the donor is concerned
about the well-being of the recipient, an increase in remittances will lead to an increase in the
sending of inter-household transfers. The same prediction holds for the exchange motive: an
increase in remittances received enables the donor to send more transfers to benefit from more
services in the future from transfer recipients. However, the predictions are more ambiguous if the
decision to send inter-household transfers is based on insurance motives. Dercon (2005) argues
that households may have incentives to leave a risk-sharing arrangement if they feel that staying
in the arrangement is no longer in their interest. This could for example occur when a household
experiences a positive income shock and prefers to make private investments rather than use the
money to support others, or when the household begins to access to a new source of risk reduction
or protection.
2In addition to these three motives, Mitrut and Nordblom (2010) also find social norms to be an important
determinant of gift-giving in Romania.
3One exception is Cle´ment (2008), who also develops predictions for how inter-household transfers vary with the
income of the donor.
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Consistent with Dercon’s (2005) reasoning, households that receive remittances, and remit-
tances from abroad in particular, might be less willing to engage in informal insurance arrange-
ments if they feel that the income source in the form of remittances offers enough protection
against adverse shocks. Hence, the effect of remittances on inter-household transfers is not clear
a priori. Transfer motives may also affect how transfer patterns respond to an adverse shock. If
the motives are altruistic, an adverse shock that affects the income of the household may lead to
a decrease in the transfers sent. However, if other motives are at play, such as mutual insurance,
the shock may not automatically translate into a decrease in inter-household transfers sent. The
panel data we use in this paper, which spans the period when urban households in Ethiopia were
severely affected by the 2008 food price inflation, enables us to shed lights on the transfer motives
of remittance-receiving households.
2.2 The Ethiopian Context
Ethiopia makes an interesting case study to investigate the links between remittances and inter-
household transfers. International remittance flows to the country have increased rapidly over
the past decade. Alvi and Dendir (2009) show that households in urban areas in Ethiopia use
transfers (including remittances, inter-household transfers, and gifts) as insurance against risks.
They show that about one-third of these households are involved in transfer activities and that
gifts and transfers respond positively to measures of vulnerability such as unemployment and
illness of household heads.
The historic migration patterns in Ethiopia have been shaped by a mix of economic, political,
and environmental factors. A noticeable international out-migration took place after the 1974
revolution and the political upheavals and instability that followed. The migrants were predomi-
nantly young and educated people from the urban elite. Later, the wish to migrate spread to other
parts of the urban population, and in the 1980s the Middle East attracted migrants from both
rural and urban areas (Aredo, 2005). The migration to the Middle East has since then expanded,
especially among women, and is today one of the largest migration flows from Ethiopia (Fransen
& Kuschminder, 2009; Kebede, 2002). Following the increase in the number of Ethiopian migrants
abroad, international remittances to the country have increased substantially in recent years. Ac-
cording to World Bank estimates, the total value of the remittances has increased almost threefold
in only a few years: from USD 46 million in 2003 to USD 387 million in 2010. The National Bank
of Ethiopia reports even higher numbers: 661 million USD in 2009-2010, as cited in Geda and Irv-
ing (2011). The discrepancy is likely due to the difficulty in estimating remittances sent through
informal channels. The rapid increase in the amount of international remittances documented by
the World Bank and the National Bank of Ethiopia is consistent with the findings by Alem (2015),
who shows a 142 percent increase in the number of urban households that received international
remittances 2004-2009.
In Ethiopia, domestic migration flows are larger than the international migration flows (Fransen
& Kuchminder, 2009). However, information about internal migration and remittances is relatively
scarce. The 2008 Ethiopian Urban Migration Survey (World Bank, 2010), conducted among a
representative sample of 1,115 households in Addis Ababa, shows that although a large share
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of the internal migrants (more than 75 percent) stay in touch with their family and relatives in
their area of origin, only 13 percent of the migrants send remittances back to their family. Slightly
higher remittance rates were found by de Brauw et al. (2011) among migrants in a matched sample
of rural households and domestic migrants. About one-third of the migrants in their sample sent
remittances, which is a relatively low share compared with some of the large migration countries
such as the Philippines and China. However, the figure is quite similar to other African contexts
such as South Africa and the Kayes area of West Africa.4 Migrants without skilled employment
were less likely to send remittances, suggesting that internal remittances are low for reasons related
to economic status.
The recent period when Ethiopia experienced a rapid increase in remittances (especially inter-
national remittances) was also characterized by rapid inflation. In July 2008, commodity prices
were on average 52 percent higher than 12 months earlier, exhibiting the highest rate of inflation in
Ethiopian history. The general inflation the country experienced in that period was mainly driven
by food prices rising on average 92 percent in the 12-months period (Central Statistics Agency,
2008, 2009). Urban Ethiopian households were severely affected by the food price inflation and
about 87 percent of them reported it to be the most influential shock during that period (Alem
& So¨derbom, 2012; Headey et al., 2012). Households had to cope with the shock by for example
cutting back on quantities served per meal and receiving assistance from relatives and friends.
One objective of the present paper is therefore to investigate how the links between remittances
and inter-household transfers may be affected by an adverse shock.
3 Empirical Approach
Our main aim is to explore the effects of remittances on inter-household transfers in urban Ethiopia,
and to shed light on whether the transfer behavior responds to the occurrence of shocks. Thus,
our main outcome variable of interest is the real value of money transferred out by households.
We specify a linear transfer equation for panel data as follows:
Fit = β1Iit + β2Dit + β3Xit + Ci + Cv + Ct + Uit (1)
where subscript i denotes household, v city, and t year. Fit is the real values of transfers sent out
by household i at time t. Iit corresponds to the real value of international remittances received by
household i at time t, and Dit represents the real value of internal (domestic) remittances received.
In addition to these core variables, we include a set of household head and other household-level
variables as controls, X, that determine the amount of transfer sent by households. Ci corresponds
to the household fixed effect (unobserved heterogeneity), Cv, to the city fixed effect, and Ct, to
the year fixed effect.
The other explanatory variables captured in Xit include characteristics of the household head
(age, gender, labor market status, and education); real monthly consumption expenditures per
adult equivalent units, a proxy measure of economic status; and occupational and demographic
characteristics of other household members. Our consumption measure was constructed as the
4See de Brauw et al. (2011) for further details.
6
sum of food and non-food expenditure. The consumption expenditure aggregated at the household
level has been adjusted for spatial and temporal price differences using carefully constructed price
indices from the survey. In order to take economies of scale and differences in needs into account
we computed consumption expenditure in adult equivalent units.5
Previous research has also suggested that there might be different underlying motives for
private transfers depending on the standard of living of the sender household (Cox et al. 2004;
Kazianga, 2006; Cle´ment, 2008), i.e., the transfer response to remittances might depend on how
well off the household is. We investigate this by allowing the effect of receiving remittances to vary
with the education level of household heads, which captures the ability of households to generate
income. In doing so, we create interaction terms between international remittances and education
level of household heads and control for them in the empirical model specified above.
The fundamental problem encountered in estimating equation (1) using OLS is the possible
correlation between Xit and Ci. If such a correlation does not exist, i.e., if E(XitCi) = 0, OLS
would be consistent. However, if there is no correlation, the random effects model, which works
in a Generalized Least Square (GLS) framework would yield a more efficient estimator of the β
parameters. Very often in applied research, however, the assumption that E(XitCi) = 0 is strong,
even though the Uits are independently distributed. There are several cases under which some of
the explanatory variables including remittances (our core variables) would be correlated with the
unobserved heterogeneity term Ci. For example, in the context of the transfer equation formulated
above, sending a migrant abroad and receiving remittances would most likely be correlated with
unobserved household characteristics. Ci could also be correlated with many other explanatory
variables, such as educational achievement, as some household members may have a higher level
of motivation to pursue higher level education.
The most credible way of estimating the β parameters by disentangling the unobserved het-
erogeneity term is application of the fixed effects model, which works through OLS estimation of
the within transformation of the basic equation stated in (1). One limitation of this estimator,
however, is that the coefficients of time-invariant observable characteristics cannot be identified, as
they are dropped through the within transformation. If the interest is focused on the time-varying
variables of the model, the fixed effects estimator provides the most robust parameter estimates
(Wooldridge, 2010). If the random effects model is not supported by the test6 and there is interest
in the βs of the time-invariant variables, the reasonable model to consider is the Hausman-Taylor
two-stage model.7 In order to investigate the magnitude of the relationship between remittances
and household transfer behavior, we estimate different panel data models.
5See Alem and So¨derbom (2012) for details on construction of the consumption variable.
6The standard test for this is the Hausman test, which tests for the null hypothesis that E(XitCi) = 0
(Wooldridge, 2010).
7In this model, the explanatory variables would be categorized into four variables: time-variant and uncorrelated
with Ci, time-variant and correlated with Ci, time-invariant and uncorrelated with Ci, and time-invariant and
correlated with Ci. The model is then estimated using the exogenous variables within the model as instruments in
a two-stage framework. See Wooldridge (2010) for details.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on five rounds of the Ethiopian Urban Socio-economic Survey
(EUSS), a panel dataset collected in 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2009. The first four waves of the
data were collected by the Department of Economics at Addis Ababa University in collaboration
with the University of Gothenburg. A stratified sampling technique was used to form 1,500
households in total, which represent the Ethiopian urban population. The sample households were
allocated to seven representative cities - the capital Addis Ababa, Awassa, Bahir Dar, Dessie, Dire
Dawa, Jimma, and Mekelle - based on the proportion of their population. Once the sample size for
each city had been set, it was distributed over all weredas (districts) in each urban center. Using
the resident registry available at the urban administrative units, households were then selected
randomly from half of the kebeles (the lowest administrative units) in each wereda.
The most recent survey, fielded by the corresponding author in late 2008 and early 2009,
covered 709 households in Addis Ababa, Awassa, Dessie, and Mekelle.8 All panel households were
surveyed in three of the cities, but not in Addis Ababa, which constituted about 60 percent of the
original sample. About 350 of the original households in Addis Ababa were selected following the
sampling procedure outlined above. Out of the 709 households surveyed in the 2009 round, 128
were new households chosen randomly and incorporated into the sample. These new households
were surveyed in order to investigate whether the panel households initially selected in 1994 had
become atypical and not representative of the Ethiopian urban population. Given for instance
the rapid urbanization and structural change in Ethiopia over the past decade, the newly formed
households might be systematically different in their characteristics from the panel households,
affecting the representativeness of the data. However, Alem and So¨derbom (2012) investigate
this and find no significant difference in welfare between the panel and the newly incorporated
households.
Given that the sample size had to be reduced substantially in the most recent wave, it is
reasonable to be concerned about bias in the estimation results as a result of attrition. Alem
(2015) and Alem et al. (2014), who used the panel dataset for related research, attempted to
investigate attrition bias using attrition probits (Fitzgerald et al., 1998) and a Becketti, Gould,
Lillard, and Welch (BGLW) test (Becketti et al., 1988). Attrition probits represent estimates of
binary-choice models for the determinants of attrition in later periods as a function of base year
characteristics. The BGLW test, on the other hand, involves investigating the effect of future
attrition on the initial period’s outcome variable. Based on these tests, the authors conclude that
it is unlikely that attrition in the sample would bias the results for the remaining sample.
The dataset contains rich information at the individual and household levels related to house-
hold demographics, education, health, labor market status, and household consumption. Informa-
tion on domestic and international remittances received and transfers sent by households in the
12 months prior to the survey was also included.9 The transfers recorded in the survey can be
8Other cities were not covered due to resource constraints.
9It is possible to be concerned about the possibility that some of the international remittances might have been
transferred through the household for other households not covered in our survey. However, the EUSS survey
questions were explicit and asked about remittances received by household members only, who transferred them
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divided into three main categories: remittances from abroad, remittances from domestic sources,
and gifts received.10 In this study we focus on the first two transfer flows. The survey recorded
values of both cash and in-kind transfers. In the case of in-kind remittances, the households were
asked to estimate the monetary value in the local currency, birr. The variable for transfers sent
by a household is derived from a survey question about the total value of transfers given by the
household in the 12 months prior to the survey. The question about private transfers given is
hence not as detailed as the questions about transfers received.11 There is no detailed information
on the recipients’ transfers and what the purpose of them was.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of household transfer flows for all households by year. All
amounts are expressed in 1994 Ethiopian birr.12 As can be seen, the proportion of households
that receive international and internal remittances increased over time, with the largest increase
occurring between the two last waves. In 2009, 27.2 percent of the households received international
remittances and 25.9 percent received domestic remittances, to be compared with the shares
in 2004 of 13.9 percent and 11.1 percent, respectively. The share of households sending inter-
household transfers also increased substantially 2004-2009, from approximately 9 percent to almost
20 percent. This is the period when Ethiopia experienced rapid inflation. Thus, the rapid increase
in the proportion of households receiving remittances and those sending inter-household transfers
is not surprising, as households used these informal transfers to deal with the food price shock
(Alem & So¨derbom, 2012).
Table 1 about here
When looking at the amounts of transfer flows, the picture looks a bit different. Both real
international and domestic remittances increased in the early years of the panel and decreased in
the last year. The mean amounts of international remittances received in real terms were highest
in 2004 and lowest in 2009. Domestic remittances also followed the same trend of increasing and
then decreasing in the last round. Thus, it is evident that more households received remittances
in later years, but the mean values received in real terms declined over time, especially in the
case of international remittances. One potential explanation could be that during the food price
shock in 2008, the need for remittances increased and migrants consequently sent remittances
to more households than in previous years, reducing the real value of each remittance. Another
explanation is related to the rapid inflation the country experienced between 2004 and 2009 which
affected the price index used to adjust for spatial and temporal price differences. Remittances
and consumption expenditures have been adjusted for spatial and temporal price differences using
price indices constructed form the survey. Since prices increased more than three fold between
2004 and 2009, the nominal value of remittances in 2009 had to be deflated more proportionately
than all other years. Indeed descriptive statistics from the data show that the mean value of
international remittances received in nominal terms in 2009 was 621 birr being about 20 percent
and how they were spent.
10The survey also includes questions on public transfers, such as food aid and food-for-work. These transfers
represent very small proportions of the transfers received by the households and are excluded from the analysis.
11As discussed by, e.g., Cox et al., (2004), asking much more detailed questions about transfers received than
transfers sent could potentially lead to an underestimation of transfers sent.
12One US $ was approximately five Ethiopian birr in 1994.
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higher than the value in 2004 which was 516 birr.13
Unlike the proportion of households sending inter-household transfers, the mean value of inter-
household transfers sent documents a cyclical trend. Compared to 1994, the mean value of inter-
household transfers in real terms increased in 1997, declined in 2000, increased again in 2004 with
another decline in 2009. The decrease in the last wave might reflect the more difficult times faced
by urban households during the period of high food price inflation in 2008.
5 Regression Results
Table 2 presents panel data regression results for private transfer equations from different linear
models for households in urban Ethiopia. To test for the robustness of the effect of remittances on
inter-household transfers, we estimated the regression using four alternative specifications: pooled
ordinary least square (OLS), random effects (RE), fixed effects (FE), and Hausman-Taylor (HT)
estimators. The robust Hausman test rejects the random effects estimator (p-value of 0.000) and
consequently we do not present and discuss the RE results. Estimation results from the other
three models are presented in columns [1]-[3] of Table 2. The full set of variables used in the
regressions are presented in Table A.1 in the appendix.
The regression results from all models indicate that international remittances increase inter-
household transfers. According to the OLS results, a one percent increase in international remit-
tances results in a 0.049 percent increase in transfers to other households. However, the panel data
models that control for time-invariant unobserved factors reveal larger magnitudes. For example,
the HT regression results show that a one percent increase in international remittances results in
a 0.07 percent increase in transfers sent. This represents a 42 percent increase in the magnitude of
the international remittances variable. The results therefore imply a strong need for controlling for
unobserved household characteristics. This is consistent with the large literature on international
migration that documents that households sending a migrant abroad and receiving remittances
have distinct unobserved characteristics, that should be controlled in regressions (Lopez et al.,
2005; Ruizz & Vargas-Silva, 2009; Adams, 2011). We do not however find a statistically signif-
icant impact of domestic remittances. The variable is weakly significant (at 10 percent) in the
OLS regression but not in any of the panel data models and its magnitude (0.02) is substantially
lower than that of international remittances.
Table 2 about here
As shown in the descriptive statistics presented in the previous section, the strong impact of
international remittances on inter-household transfers is likely due to international remittances
being larger and having increased substantially in recent years. The results provide evidence
that receiving international remittances enables households to share more of their resources with
other households, which leads to trickle-down effects on non-migrant households that do not
directly receive international remittances. The increases in inter-household transfers in response
to international remittances provide some support for the altruistic and insurance motives. About
13Another plausible reason may be that remittance senders living abroad themselves might have been affected
by the global economic crisis during the 2007-2008 period.
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82 percent of international remittances received by households were sent by their grown children,
which suggests additional evidence for these motives.
Sending of inter-household transfers is also influenced by the economic status of the sending
household as measured by the log value of real consumption expenditure per capita. OLS results
show that a one percent increase in real consumption expenditure per capita increases transfers sent
by 0.41 percent. However, about 25 percent of this impact is explained by unobserved household
characteristics. This can be seen from the decline in the magnitude of the consumption variable
to 0.31 in the HT model. The positive impact of consumption expenditure on inter-household
transfers is consistent with the altruistic motive of sending transfers, i.e., sender households are
concerned about the well-being of the recipient and hence increase the transfer amounts as their
income increases.
We will now analyze how inter-household transfers sent are affected by observable household
head characteristics. Regression results reported in Table 2 suggest that households headed by indi-
viduals with tertiary education and those headed by an employer or a self-employed worker transfer
more than the reference groups (uneducated heads and out-of-the-labor force heads, respectively).
OLS results show that compared with a household with an illiterate head, a household headed
by an individual with tertiary education has a 72.4 percent higher probability of sending inter-
household transfers. The dummy for tertiary education in fact represents the largest coefficient
of all control variables included in the transfer equation. However, controlling for time-invariant
household unobservables reduces the impact of tertiary education as well. According to the HT
model, the impact of a household being headed by a person with tertiary education is 0.486, rep-
resenting a 48.6 percent higher likelihood of sending out inter-household transfer compared with
a household headed by an illiterate individual. Previous studies in urban Ethiopia (e.g., Alem &
So¨derbom, 2012; Alem et al., 2014; Alem, 2015; Gebremedhin, & Whelan, 2005) have documented
that these types of households enjoy higher level of consumption and subjective well-being and are
less likely to be in poverty. This most probably reflects the large return to tertiary education in
the rapidly growing Ethiopian urban sector. The results also show that male-headed households
are more likely than female-headed households to send inter-household transfers.
The present paper takes a comprehensive view of the household and considers the role of
other household members in household decisions. We control for a broad set of other household
members’ occupational and demographic characteristics in our transfer equations. All three linear
models presented in Table 2 suggest that not only household head characteristics but also other
household members’ occupational and demographic characteristics have a significant effect on the
amount of transfers sent. Consistent with our discussion above, households with more members
earning a living as a self-employed worker, a civil/public sector worker, or a private sector worker
have a higher likelihood of sending inter-household transfers. This likely captures the role of other
household members in household-level decisions and highlights the importance of controlling for
them in addition to the commonly used household head characteristics.
Finally, the coefficients on the city and time dummies indicate a clear spatial and temporal
variation in the amount of inter-household transfers sent by households in urban parts of Ethiopia.
Compared with the reference group (households in Mekelle), households in the capital Addis have
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a 21.2 percent lower probability of sending inter-household transfers. Addis is a more developed
metropolitan city than Mekelle with better access to modern financial institutions. As a result,
controlling for all other relevant variables, households may have a lower likelihood of engaging in
transfer arrangements. The results also show that inter-household transfers increased significantly
in the most recent wave, i.e., in 2009. This wave captured the country’s unprecedented food price
shock, which led to a significant proportion of households engaging in inter-household transfers.
The 2009 wave included a question on households’ strategies to cope with the food price shock.
The responses to this question are consistent with this observation.14 The data shows that ap-
proximately 22 percent of the households stated assistance from relatives or friends as their main
coping mechanism to cope with the food price shock, making it second in importance only to
cutting back on quantities served per meal.
Heterogenous Effects by Education
Previous research has suggested that the motives for inter-household transfers for the sending
household may vary with the standard of living of the household (Cox et al., 2004; Kazianga,
2006; Cle´ment, 2008). It is therefore possible that the transfer response to remittances depends
on how well off the household is. We investigate if receiving remittances has a differential impact
on transfers sent out by allowing the effect of receiving remittances to vary with the education
level of household heads, which captures the underlying ability of households to generate income.
In doing so, we created interaction terms between the educational level of household heads and
international remittances and ran all regression models.
The regression results with interaction terms for private transfer equations are presented in
Table 3. The results provide interesting insights regarding the role of international remittances on
inter-household transfers based on education level of household heads. The effect of international
remittances on private transfers is lower for households headed by an individual with tertiary
education. The magnitude of the interaction term between tertiary education and international
remittances is -0.09 and -0.08 in the fixed effects and Hausman-Taylor models, respectively. This
indicates that receiving international remittances has a lower effect on inter-household transfers if
the household head has completed tertiary education. Households headed by an individual with
tertiary education are relatively well off and often the head works in the formal sector. In view
of this, they are likely to have access to modern financial institutions and hence are less likely to
engage in inter-household transfers.
Table 3 about here
6 Conclusions
Households in developing countries without access to formal financial institutions engage in a
variety of informal strategies to deal with risk and shocks. International remittances are a type of
14As shown by Alem & So¨derbom (2012), the most widespread and severe shock that the households faced was
by far the food price shock: 94 percent of the households stated that they had experienced such a shock, and 87
percent identified the increase in food prices as the shock with the strongest impact on the household.
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informal transfer that has attracted increasing attention in the literature on transfers in developing
countries. This paper used five waves of panel data to investigate the role of remittances on inter-
household transfer behavior - an aspect that has not received sufficient attention in previous
studies. The availability of such a long panel dataset enabled us to control for confounding time-
invariant unobserved household factors and explore the role of remittances on households’ transfer
behavior. We estimated alternative linear panel data models for transfer equations by households
in urban Ethiopia.
Regression results show that receiving international remittances increases the value of transfers
sent by recipient households. A one percent increase in international remittances results in a
0.07 increase in inter-household transfers sent. The magnitude of domestic remittances on the
other hand is very low (0.02) and statistically insignificant, suggesting that it plays little role in
stimulating inter-household transfers. The most plausible explanation for these results - suggested
by the patterns in our data and the regression results - is that international remittances are
larger in amount and have a positive impact on transfers sent, mainly through the altruistic
and informal insurance motives. Most international remittances (about 82%) are transferred by
children of household heads, providing additional evidence for these motives. We also documented
that both remittances and private transfers increased substantially in the period when the country
experienced a rapid food price shock. This provides strong evidence that informal transfers serve
as an important mechanisms to cope with shocks.
We provided the first comprehensive evidence on the possible role of international remittances
in stimulating inter-household transfers using panel data that tracks the same households for a long
period in a developing country. If households transfer more when they receive more international
remittances, the effect of international remittances on welfare in recipient countries extends beyond
the direct recipient households. We document this trickle-down effect, and thus our results are
relevant in that they shed light on the possible additional channels through which remittances can
affect household outcomes in migrant source countries. Although our panel data is rich and the
longest ever to be used in the context of our paper, we acknowledge the possible limitations of our
study. Our data did not contain information on which countries the international remittances were
transferred from and what the exact motives for inter-household transfers were. Future research
with more detailed data on households’ transfer motives and the characteristics of recipients of
inter-household transfers could shed additional light on the topic explored.
13
References
• Adams, R. H. (2011). Evaluating the economic impact of internaitonal remittances on
developing countries using household surveys: A literature review. Journal of Development
Studies, 46(7), 699-713.
• Adams, R., Cuecuecha, A., & Page, J. (2008). The Impact of Remittances on Poverty and
Inequality in Ghana. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
• Alem, Y. (2015). Poverty dynamics and intra-household heterogeneity in occupations: Evi-
dence from urban Ethiopia, Oxford Development Studies, 43(1), 20-43.
• Alem, Y., Ko¨hlin, G., & Stage, J. (2014). The Persistence of Subjective Poverty in Urban
Ethiopia. World Development, 56, 51-61.
• Alem, Y., & Ko¨hlin, G. (2013). The Impact of Food Price Inflation on Subjective Well-being:
Evidence from Urban Ethiopia. Social Indicators Research, 116, 853-868.
• Alem, Y., & So¨derbom, M. (2012). Household-Level Consumption in Urban Ethiopia: The
Effects of a Large Food Price Shock. World Development, 40(1), 146-162.
• Alvi, E., & Dendir, S. (2009 ). Private transfer, informal loans and risk sharing among poor
urban households in Ethiopia. Journal of Development Studies, 45(8), 1325-1343.
• Andersson, L. (2012). Migration, Remittances and Household Welfare in Ethiopia. Working
paper, University of Gothenburg
• Aredo, D. (2005). Migrant Remittances, Shocks and Poverty in Urban Ethiopia: An Analysis
of Micro Level Panel Data. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University.
• Asfaw, A., & Admassie, A. (2004). The role of household member’s education on the adop-
tion of agricultural inputs under different environments in Ethiopia, Agricultural Economics,
30 (3), 215-228.
• Becker, G. (1974). A Theory of Social Interactions. The Journal of Political Economy, 82(6),
1063-1093.
• Becketti, S., Gould, W., Lillard, L. & Welch, F. (1988) The panel study of income dynamics
after fourteen years: an evaluation, Journal of Labor Economics, 6(4), pp. 472-492.
• Beyene, B. M. (2012). The Link Between International Remittances and Private Inter-
household Transfers. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Oslo. 25
• Bigsten, A., Kebede, B., Shimeles, A., & Daddesse, M. (2003). Growth and poverty red-
ucation in Ethiopia: Evidence from household panel surveys. World Development, 31 (1),
87-106.
• Central Statistical Agency (2008). Country and Regional Level Consumer Price Indices.
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
14
• Central Statistical Agency (2009). Country and Regional Level Consumer Price Indices,
August 2009. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
• Cle´ment, M. (2008). The relationship between private transfers and household income with
regard to the assumptions of altruism, exchange and risk sharing: an empirical analysis
applied to Russia. Post-Communist Economies, 173-187.
• Combes, J. & Ebeke, C. (2010). Remittances and household consumption instability in
developing countries. World Development, 39(7), 1076-1089.
• Cox, D. (1987). Motives for Private Income Transfers. Journal of Political Economy, 95(3),
508-540.
• Cox, D., & Jimenez, E. (1998a). Risk Sharing and Private Transferse: What about Urban
Households? Economic Development and Cultural Change, 46 (3), 621-637.
• Cox, D., Eser, Z., & Jimenez, E. (1998b). Motives for private transfers over the life cycle: an
analytical framework and evidence for Peru. Journal of Development Economics, 55, 57-87.
• Cox, D., Hansen, B., & Jimenez, E. (2004). How Responsive are Private Transfer Incomes:
Evidence from a Laissez-faire Economy. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2193-2219.
• de Brauw, A., Mueller, V., & Woldehanna, T. (2011). Insurance Motives to Remit: Evidence
from a Matched Sample of Ethiopian Internal Migrants. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01090.
• Deaton, A (1997). The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to
Development Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Deaton, A., & Grosh, M. (2000). Consumption. In: Grosh, M. & Glewee, P. (Eds): Design-
ing household survey questionnaires for developing countries: lessons from 15 years of the
living standards measurement study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Dercon, S. ( 2005). Risk, insurance and poverty: a review. In S. Dercon, Insurance against
poverty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Fafchamps, M., & Lund, S. (2003). Risk-sharing networks in rural Philippines. Journal of
Development Economics, 71, 261-287.
• Fitzgerald, J., Gottschalk, P. & Moffitt, R. (1998) An analysis of sample attrition in panel
data, Journal of Human Resources, 33(2), 251-299.
• Foster, A., & Rosenzweig, M. (2001). Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, and the Family:
Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low Income Rural Areas. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 83 (3), 389-407.
• Fransen, S., & Kuchminder, K. (2009). Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and
Future Prospects. Paper Series: Migration and Development Country Profiles: Mastricht
Graduate School of Governance.
15
• Gebremedhin, T. A., & Whelan, S. (2005). Prices and poverty in urban Ethiopia. Working
paper No. 5, School of Economics and Political Science, University of Sydney.
• Geda, A., & Irving, J. (2011). Ethiopia. In D. Ratha, Remittance Markets in Africa (pp.
113-131). Washington DC: The World Bank.
• Headey, D., Nisrane, F., Worku, I. D., & Tafesse, A. (2012). Urban Wage Behaviour and
Food Price Inflation: the Case of Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: IFPRI and EDRI Ethiopia
Strategy Support Programme II, Working Paper 41.
• Jacoby, H. G., & Skoufias, E. 1997. Risk, Financial Markets, and Human Capital in a
Developing Country. Review of Economic Studies, 64(3), 311?35.
• Kazianga, H. (2006). Motives for Household Private Transfers in Bukina Faso. Journal of
Development Economics, 79, 73-117.
• Kebede, E. (2002). Ethiopia: An Assessment of the International Migration Situation, The
case of female labour migrants. GENPROM Working Paper No. 3.
• Lokshin, M., Bontch-Osmolovski, M., & Glinskaya, E. (2010). Work-related migration and
poverty reduction in Nepal. Review of Development Economics, 14(2), 323-332.
• Lopez-Cordova, E., & Olmedo, A. (2005) International remittances and development: ex-
isting evidence, policies and recommendations. Unpublished manuscript, Inter-American
Development Bank, Washington, DC.
• Lucas, R., & Stark, O. (1985). Motivations to remit: evidence from Botswana. Journal of
Political Economy, 901-918.
• Mitrut, A., & Nordblom, K. (2010). Social norms and gift behavior: Theory and evidence
from Romania. European Economic Review, 54(4), 998-1015.
• Paxson, C. H. (1992). Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to
Transitory Income in Thailand. American Economic Review, 82 (1), 15-33.
• Rosenzweig, M. (1988). Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low-income
countries. Economic Journal, 98(393), 1148-1170.
• Rosenzweig, M. R., & Wolpin, K.I (1993). Credit Market Constraints, Consumption Smooth-
ing, and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income Countries: Invest-
ment in Bullocks in India. Journal of political Economy, 101(2), 223-244.
• Ruiz, I., & Vargas-Silva, C. (2009) To send or not to send: that is the question. A review of
the literature on workers’ remittances. Journal of Business Strategies, 26(1), 73-98.
• Social Science Research Council (2009). Web anthology on migrant remittances and devel-
opment. Accessed at http://www.ssrc.org/programs/web-anthology.
16
• Taylor, J. (1999). The New Economics of Labor Migration and the Role of Remittances in
the Migration Process. International Migration, 37(1), 63-88.
• Taylor, J., Mora, J., Adams, J., & Lopez-Feldman, A. (2005). Remittances, inequality and
poverty: evidence from rural Mexico. Working Paper 05-003, University of California Davis,
CA.
• Townsend, R. (1994). Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica, 62(May), 539-592.
• Udry, C. (1995). Risk and Saving in Northern Nigeria? American Economic Review, 85(5),
1287-1300.
• Wooldridge, J. (2010). The Econometrics of Cross-Sectional and Panel Data, 2nd ed. (Cam-
bridge, MA; and London, UK: MIT Press).
• World Bank (2010). The Ethiopian Urban Migration Study 2008: The Characteristics,
Motives and Outcomes of Migrants to Addis Ababa. Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management, African Region. Report No. 55731-ET.
• World Bank (2011). Migration and Remittances Factbook. Washington D.C.: The World
Bank.
• Yang, D., & Martinez, C. (2006). Remittances and poverty in migrants’ home areas: Ev-
idence from the Philippines. In C. O. Schiff, International migration, remittances and the
brain drain (pp. 81-121). Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
17
Table 1: Remittances received and inter-household transfers sent over time
1994 1997 2000 2004 2009
Received International Remittances 0.060 0.073 0.107 0.139 0.272
0.237 0.260 0.310 0.346 0.446
Received Domestic Remittances 0.093 0.109 0.086 0.111 0.259
0.291 0.312 0.280 0.315 0.438
Sent Inter-household Transfers 0.094 0.120 0.081 0.092 0.195
0.292 0.325 0.274 0.289 0.396
Real Value of International Remittances Received 178.384 282.390 363.772 417.257 181.44
1141.627 1584.864 1744.703 1630.806 603.630
Real Value of Domestic Remittances Received 81.637 106.538 90.132 130.635 67.1350
433.543 571.814 546.131 631.136 210.6430
Real Value of Inter-household Transfers Sent 57.102 68.528 34.301 66.911 28.2348
334.236 407.304 185.512 409.219 205.1867
Observations 968 934 970 979 580
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Table 2: The impact of remittances on inter-household transfers sent
OLS FE HT
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Real value of international remittances (log) 0.049*** 0.015 0.067*** 0.014 0.070*** 0.014
Real value of domestic remittances (log) 0.022* 0.013 0.023 0.015 0.024 0.015
Real consumption aeu (log) 0.414*** 0.042 0.254*** 0.053 0.318*** 0.049
Age of head -0.006 0.011 0.001 0.017 -0.003 0.012
Age of head squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Head, male 0.173*** 0.058 0.019 0.115 0.193*** 0.068
Head, primary schooling compeleted 0.059 0.057 -0.048 0.096 -0.031 0.094
Head, secondary schooling completed 0.115 0.072 0.107 0.111 0.160 0.107
Head, tertiary schooling completed 0.724*** 0.155 0.292* 0.172 0.486*** 0.162
Head, employer/own-account worker 0.157** 0.068 0.138 0.110 0.163** 0.074
Head, civil/public sector employee 0.116 0.087 -0.143 0.134 0.115 0.088
Head, private sector employee 0.101 0.110 -0.032 0.149 0.091 0.110
Head, casual worker -0.032 0.078 -0.008 0.137 -0.043 0.099
No. of own-account worker members 0.199*** 0.071 0.273*** 0.071 0.201*** 0.055
No. of civil/public sector employee members 0.108** 0.050 0.104* 0.063 0.129*** 0.048
No. of private sector employee members 0.235*** 0.051 0.120** 0.051 0.223*** 0.039
No. of casual worker members 0.039 0.037 0.054 0.070 0.025 0.056
No. of unemployed members 0.034 0.025 0.058 0.038 0.026 0.028
No. of out-of-labor-force members 0.023 0.021 0.037 0.029 0.016 0.021
No. of children members 0.060*** 0.019 0.066** 0.029 0.050*** 0.019
Number of elderly members -0.088 0.090 -0.047 0.128 -0.086 0.094
Addis -0.195** 0.098 0.000 . -0.212** 0.105
Dessie -0.189 0.123 0.000 . -0.207 0.135
Awassa -0.039 0.145 0.000 . -0.022 0.145
Year 1997 0.137* 0.077 0.158** 0.077 0.145* 0.074
Year 2000 -0.135* 0.074 -0.114 0.085 -0.142* 0.078
Year 2004 -0.108 0.077 -0.062 0.087 -0.107 0.077
Year 2009 0.214** 0.105 0.257** 0.112 0.201** 0.095
Intercept -1.603*** 0.360 -1.100** 0.529 -1.175*** 0.422
Observations 4424 4424 4424
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Table 3: Heterogenous impact of remittances on private transfer sent out by educational status
OLS FE HT
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
Real value of international remittances (log) 0.044* 0.026 0.071*** 0.026 0.071*** 0.026
Real value of domestic remittances (log) 0.022* 0.013 0.023 0.015 0.024 0.015
Real consumption aeu (log) 0.409*** 0.042 0.249*** 0.053 0.303*** 0.049
Age of head -0.006 0.011 0.002 0.017 -0.003 0.012
Age of head squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Head, male 0.174*** 0.058 0.010 0.115 0.194*** 0.067
Head, primary schooling completed 0.035 0.055 -0.065 0.100 -0.066 0.098
Head, secondary schooling completed 0.108 0.071 0.111 0.114 0.132 0.110
Head, tertiary schooling completed 0.799*** 0.164 0.440** 0.182 0.672*** 0.171
Head, employer/own-account worker 0.161** 0.068 0.149 0.110 0.167** 0.074
Head, civil/public sector employee 0.118 0.087 -0.125 0.134 0.110 0.088
Head, private sector employee 0.109 0.110 -0.017 0.149 0.096 0.110
Head, casual worker -0.025 0.078 0.009 0.137 -0.038 0.099
No. of own-account worker members 0.196*** 0.071 0.269*** 0.071 0.197*** 0.055
No. of civil/public sector employee members 0.106** 0.050 0.108* 0.063 0.123*** 0.047
No. of private sector employee members 0.238*** 0.051 0.125** 0.051 0.229*** 0.039
No. of casual worker members 0.040 0.037 0.055 0.070 0.025 0.056
No. of unemployed members 0.032 0.025 0.057 0.038 0.024 0.028
No. of out-of-labor-force members 0.023 0.021 0.038 0.029 0.018 0.021
No. of children members 0.059*** 0.019 0.066** 0.029 0.048*** 0.019
Number of elderly members -0.089 0.090 -0.044 0.128 -0.090 0.094
International Remittances*Primary 0.030 0.037 0.024 0.033 0.022 0.031
International Remittances*Secondary 0.007 0.035 -0.001 0.033 -0.017 0.031
International Remittances*Tertiary -0.063 0.060 -0.099** 0.046 -0.080* 0.042
Addis -0.196** 0.098 0.000 . -0.207** 0.104
Dessie -0.198 0.124 0.000 . -0.215 0.135
Awassa -0.043 0.145 0.000 . -0.025 0.144
Year 1997 0.140* 0.077 0.163** 0.077 0.151** 0.074
Year 2000 -0.135* 0.074 -0.113 0.085 -0.131* 0.077
Year 2004 -0.106 0.077 -0.059 0.087 -0.101 0.077
Year 2009 0.213** 0.105 0.254** 0.112 0.204** 0.095
Intercept -1.568*** 0.360 -1.097** 0.528 -1.086*** 0.420
Observations 4424 4424 4424
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 1994-2009
Coeff. SD
Real consumption per capita (log) 4.645 0.800
Age of head 50.168 13.693
Head, male 0.567 0.496
Head, primary schooling completed 0.338 0.473
Head, jun-sec schooling completed 0.331 0.471
Head, tertiary schooling completed 0.081 0.272
Head, employer/own-account worker 0.266 0.442
Head, civil/public servant 0.198 0.399
Head, private sector employee 0.079 0.270
Head, casual worker 0.111 0.314
No. of own-account worker members 0.160 0.481
No. of civil/public servant members 0.255 0.580
No. of private sector employee members 0.322 0.694
No. of casual worker members 0.144 0.473
No. of unemployed members 0.614 1.005
No. of out-of-labor-force members 1.488 1.375
No. of children 1.819 1.669
No. of elderly 0.077 0.282
Addis 0.750 0.433
Awassa 0.071 0.257
Dessie 0.088 0.283
Observations 4426
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